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Introduction
Contrary to popular opinion, nationalism is a contemporary 
phenomenon. Until recently most people primarily identified with 
and owed their ultimate allegiance to their religion or empire 
on the macro level or tribe, city, and local region on the micro 
level. This was all the more so in the Middle East, where the 
Islamic umma or community existed (1)and the Ottoman Empire 
prevailed until the end of World War I.(2) Only then did Arab, 
Turkish, and Iranian nationalism begin to create modern nation-
states.(3) In reaction to these new Middle Eastern nationalisms, 
Kurdish nationalism developed even more recently. The 
purpose of this article is to analyze this situation. 
 Broadly speaking, there are two main schools of thought on 
the origins of the nation and nationalism. The primordialists or 
essentialists argue that the concepts have ancient roots and 
thus date back to some distant point in history. John Armstrong, 
for example, argues that nations or nationalities slowly emerged 
in the premodern period through such processes as symbols, 
communication, and myth, and thus predate nationalism. 
Although he admits that nations are created, he maintains that 
they existed before the rise of nationalism.(4) Anthony D. Smith 
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agrees with the primordialist school when 
he argues that the origins of the nation lie in 
the ethnie, which contains such attributes as 
a mythomoteur or constitutive political myth 
of descent, a shared history and culture, a 
specific territory, and a sense of solidarity.(5) 
The constructionists, on the other 
hand, maintain that nationalism is a recent 
construction that in effect has invented 
nations. Ernest 
Gellner and Benedict 
Anderson, for example, 
have argued that 
states create nations. 
“Nationalism is not the 
awakening of nations 
to self-consciousness: it invents nations 
where they do not exist”(6)-or as Anderson 
puts it, “imagines”(7) them through such 
mechanisms as “print capitalism.” Massimo 
d’Azeglio, an Italian nationalist leader during 
the Risorgimento, reputedly exclaimed: 
“We have made Italy, now we have to make 
Italians.”(8) Eugene Weber has documented 
the recent process of changing “peasants 
into Frenchmen,” that is how most rural and 
village inhabitants of France did not think of 
themselves as members of the French nation 
as late as 1870 or even up to the eve of World 
War I.(9)
Primordial Kurdish Nationalism
Most Kurdish nationalists would be 
considered primordialists because they would 
argue that the origins of their nation and 
nationalism reach back into time immemorial. 
Many see themselves as the descendants of 
the ancient Medes who overthrew the Assyrian 
Empire in 612 B.C.E. They also can recite 
interesting myths about their origins regarding 
King Solomon, jinn, the 
blacksmith Kawa who 
defeated the ruthless 
ruler Zohhak who had 
been feeding the brains 
of young men to two 
giant serpents’ heads 
growing from his shoulders, and their national 
holiday Newroz celebrating the beginning of 
spring or the new year. Some believe that 
the Kardouchoi, who gave Xenophon and his 
10,000 such a mauling as they retreated from 
Persia in 401 B.C.E, were also the ancestors 
of the Kurds. 
Mehrdad Izady observes that “reconstruction 
of the Kurdish history is a difficult task” 
because it “has all too often... been written 
by its hegemons... The Kurds have not been 
hegemons for over 800 year. The result is 
that Kurdish contributions to history have 
been ignored, or worse, appropriated by other 
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peoples.”(10) Nevertheless, Izady argues that 
the period from the 5th century BC through the 
6th century AD “marks the homogenization 
and consolidation of the modern Kurdish 
national identity. The ethnic designator Kurd is 
established finally, and applied to all segments 
of the nation.”(11) 
In examining linguistic and historical data, 
Vladimir F. Minorsky is more circumspect. He 
finds that “the Muslim sources and Kurdish 
traditions do not help us to solve the problem 
of the origin of the Kurds,” but concludes that 
“we thus find that about the period of the Arab 
conquest [mid 7th century] a single ethnic 
term Kurd (plural, Akrad) was beginning to 
be applied to an amalgamation of Iranian or 
iranicised tribes.”(12) Minorsky adds that “we 
have detailed notices of the Kurds from the 
time of the Arab conquest onwards. During 
the five first centuries of the Hidjra, the Kurds 
frequently played a considerable part in events 
and often took the initiative in them. Several 
Kurd dynasties arose at this time.”(13) Edith 
and E. F. Penrose, simply observe that “the 
Kurdish consciousness of separate identity 
goes back far in history.”(14) 
History does record that Saladin (1137-93) 
was arguably the greatest and most famous 
of the Kurds. In 1171, he overthrew the Shiite 
Fatimid caliphate in Egypt and established the 
Sunni Ayyubid dynasty that ruled throughout 
Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.(15) Saladin, of course, 
gained his greatest fame in the West as the 
chivalrous Muslim leader who defeated the 
Christian Crusaders led by the English king 
Richard the Lion Heart and regained the holy 
city of Jerusalem for Islam. 
In 1597, the Kurdish mir (prince) Sharaf 
Khan Bitlisi (1543-1603) published the 
Sharafnama,(16) an erudite history of the 
semi-independent Kurdish emirates, some 
of which continued to exist into the middle of 
the nineteenth century. The first part of this 
impressive history written in Persian dealt with 
five Kurdish dynasties that had enjoyed status 
as royalty or what might be interpreted as 
independence: the Marwanids of Diyarbakir 
and Jazire, the Hasanwayhids of Dinawar 
and Shahrizur, the Fadluyids of the Great 
Lur, the princes of Little Lur, and the Ayyubids 
established by Saladin. The second part of 
Sharaf Khan’s Sharafnama went on to list 
Kurdish dynasties that had had coins struck 
and the khutba recited in their names. These 
attributes also reflected the equivalent of 
independence. Many contemporary Kurdish 
nationalists, therefore, point to the Sharafnama 
as historical documentation of the antiquity of 
their nation and nationalism. 
One hundred years later, Ahmadi Khan 
KUFA REVIEW: Academic Journal
32 KUFA REVIEW: No.2 - Issue 1 - Winter 2013
Most Kurdish nationalists would be 
considered primordialists because they 
would argue that the origins of their 
nation and nationalism reach back into 
time immemorial
composed Mem u Zin, a tragic love poem 
universally hailed as the Kurdish national epic 
because of its obvious references to Kurdish 
nationalist beliefs: “If only there were harmony 
among us, if we were to obey a single one 
of us, he would reduce to vassalage Turks, 
Arabs and Persians, 
all of them. We would 
perfect our religion, 
our state, and would 
educate ourselves 
in learning and 
wisdom.”(17) In referring 
to the divisions among 
the Kurds, Ahmadi Khan, of course, was also 
identifying the recurring and most important 
factor stymying Kurdish nationalism today. 
Thus, elsewhere in his epic, Ahmadi Khan 
bemoans the results of this Kurdish division: 
“Look, from the Arabs to the Georgians, the 
Kurds have become like towers. The Turks and 
Persians are surrounded by them. The Kurds 
are on all four corners. Both sides have made 
the Kurdish people targets for the arrows of 
fate. They are said to be keys to the borders, 
each tribe forming a formidable bulwark. 
Whenever the Ottoman Sea [Ottomans] and 
Tajik Sea [Persians] flow out and agitate, the 
Kurds get soaked in blood separating them 
[the Turks and Persians] like an isthmus.”(18) In 
analyzing Kurdish nationalism in Mem u Zin, 
Ferhad Shakely concludes that Ahmadi Khan 
“was proud of being a Kurd and thought that 
the Kurds were a nation like other neighbouring 
peoples and not inferior.”(19)
Amir Hassanpour argues that the 
Sharafnama and 
Mem u Zin mark the 
historical origin of 
Kurdish nationalism: 
“Sharaf Khan’s 
work demonstrates 
a conscious effort 
to assert Kurdish 
statehood.”(20) Interestingly, Hassanpour 
views the development of Kurdish nationalism 
through Marxist lens of social classes 
progressing through what he terms feudal and 
bourgeois nationalism. He also emphasizes 
the importance of the Kurdish emirates, some 
of which existed up to the middle of the 19th 
century as autonomous political entities. 
In addition, he refers to the 19th century 
Kurdish patriotic poet Haji Qadir Koyi as “next 
to [Ahmadi] Khani... the second apostle of 
Kurdayeti [Kurdish nationalism].”(21)
In Kurdish history and heroic folklore, 
Dimdim (in Persian Dumdum) has become 
a sort of Kurdish Masada. It was at this 
mountain fortress near the western shore of 
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Lake Urmia that Hatem Beg, the grand vizier 
of the Safavid Persian shah Abbas the Great, 
besieged the Baradust mir Khan Yakdas from 
November 1609 to the summer of 1610. When 
the Persians finally took Dimdim, they found 
that all its defenders had committed suicide 
rather than be captured. Bayti Dimdim treats 
the siege of Dimdim as a Kurdish struggle 
against foreign domination and is considered 
by many as a national epic, second only to 
Ahmadi Khan’s Mem u Zin. 
Although no records exist of pre-Islamic 
Kurdish literature and much undoubtedly has 
been lost because of the ceaseless conflicts 
that have ravished Kurdistan, it is possible 
to mention a few other important works and 
authors. In the first place, however, one 
should note that there have long been Kurdish 
authors who wrote in Arabic, Persian, and 
Turkish, while in modern times many Kurds 
used Western languages. Usage of these other 
languages obscures the Kurdish origins of this 
literature. The 13th-century Kurdish historian 
and biographer Ibn al-
Athir wrote in Arabic, 
while at the beginning 
of the 16th century Idris 
Bitlisi’s Hasht Behesht 
(The Eight Paradises) 
traced the early history 
of the Ottoman sultans in Persian. Melaye 
Cizri was a famous Sufi poet in the early part of 
the 17th century who declared, “I am the rose 
of Eden of Botan; I am the torch of the knights 
of Kurdistan.” His poems remain popular 
today. Other early Kurdish authors include 
the famous 14th-century Islamic historian and 
geographer, Abu al-Fida; the great poet of 
the Turkish language, Fuduli (died 1556); Eli 
Heriri; Mele Ahmed of Bate; and Mir Mihemed 
of Mukis, surnamed Feqiye Teyran. 
Under the patronage of the Ardalan court, a 
number of excellent Kurdish poets also wrote 
in the Gurani Kurdish language. This list covers 
the period from Mulla Muhammad Pareshan in 
the 15th century to Mulla Abdal Rahim Mawlawi 
in the 19th century, and also includes Ahmede 
Texti, Sheikh Mistefa Besarani, Khanay 
Qubadi, and Mahzuni. Gurani only ceased as 
a court literary language with the downfall of 
the Ardalan emirate in the mid-19th century. 
Its former literary ascendancy is possibly still 
reflected by the fact that the term gorani is the 
common word for song 
in the modern Kurdish 
Sorani language. 
The 19th and 
20th centuries saw 
so many noteworthy 
Kurdish authors that it 
Many contemporary Kurdish 
nationalists, therefore, point to 
the Sharafnama as historical 
documentation of the antiquity of 
their nation and nationalism
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is impossible to list all of them. A partial roll 
would include the aforementioned Haji Qadir 
Koyi; the much-adored patriotic journalist, Haji 
(Piremerd) Tewfiq; the incomparable Kurdish-
Syrian scholar, Muhammad Farid Kurd Ali; 
the vibrant patriotic poet, Sexmus Hesen 
Cegerxwin; Faiq Abdallah Bakes; Abdallah 
Mihemed Ziwer; Ahmad Shawki, the Kurdish-
Egyptian who was known as the prince of poets; 
the Kurdish-Egyptian 
brothers, Muhammad 
and Mahmud Taymur; 
and Mihemed Shheikh 
Abdul Kerim Qani; 
among many others. 
In 1898, Kurdistan, 
a journal published 
in Cairo by a group 
of Kurdish exiles, proved seminal in the 
development of Kurdish literature and modern 
Kurdish nationalism. 
In 1880, Sheikh Ubeydullah of Nehri led a 
famous but ultimately unsuccessful revolt that 
is sometimes said to have been the prototype 
for subsequent Kurdish nationalist revolts. In 
a famous letter to the British consul-general in 
Tabriz, Ubeydullah seemingly made obvious 
references to some kind of pre-existing 
Kurdish nationalism when he declared that: 
“the Kurdish nation... is a people apart. Their 
religion is different and their laws and customs 
are distinct... We also are a nation apart. We 
want our affairs to be in our own hands.”(22)  
Constructionist Kurdish Nationalism
Despite these primordial or essentialist 
arguments for the antiquity of Kurdish 
nationalism, such interpretations can be 
challenged for a 
number of very solid 
reasons. In the first 
place, of course, the 
very concept of the 
nation and nationalism 
being the focus of 
one’s supreme loyalty 
is relatively new even 
in the West, where many would argue that 
it only began to develop in the latter part of 
the 18th century and specifically during the 
French Revolution which began in 1789.(23) 
The concept is even newer in the Middle East. 
Turkish, Iranian, and even Arab nationalism 
largely emerged only after World War I 
following the demise of the multi-national 
Ottoman Empire and its emphasis on Islam 
as the supreme focus of one’s loyalty. Martin 
van Bruinessen, for example, disputes the oft-
made claim that Ahmadi Khani’s 17th century 
there have long been Kurdish 
authors who wrote in Arabic, 
Persian, and Turkish, while in 
modern times many Kurds used 
Western languages. Usage of these 
other languages obscures the 
Kurdish origins of this literature
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epic Mem u Zin was a precursor of modern 
Kurdish nationalism. He argues that neither 
the political nor socio-economic prerequisites 
existed in 17th century Kurdistan for any 
notion of the nation to exist because tribes 
were the main collectivity with which the Kurds 
identified. “In general, people did not identify 
themselves as ethnic groups or nations in the 
way that people nowadays do.”(24)
Hugh Seton-Watson analyzes the rise of 
what he calls “official nationalism” in such 
multi-national states as Russia and Hungary 
during the second half of the 19th century: 
“The leaders of the most powerful nations... 
impose[d] their nationality on all their subjects-
of whatever religion, language or culture... As 
they saw it... they were strengthening their state 
by creating within it a single homogeneous 
nation.”(25) Russification in the Russian Empire 
under Alexander III and Nicholas II imagined 
a nation without diversity, and subsequently 
became the model for many of the new states 
in the Middle East like Iraq, Turkey, and Iran.
Denise Natali illustrates how “in both the 
Ottoman and Qajar 
[Persian] Empires the 
absence of an exclusive 
official nationalist project 
based on ethnicity 
prevented Kurdayeti 
[Kurdish nationalism] from becoming salient 
or highly ethnicized.”(26) Following World War 
I, however, “different forms of Kurdayeti have 
evolved in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran as a function 
of the political space in each state.”(27) Hakan 
Ozoglu aptly demonstrates how Kurdish 
nationalism only began to emerge in Turkey 
after the Ottoman Empire collapsed and the 
Kurdish notables had to seek a new identity. 
“Kurdish nationalism appeared to be the only 
viable choice for Kurds in the absence of a 
functioning ideology such as Ottomanism. It 
was a result of a desperate search for identity 
after Ottomanism failed.”(28) Thus, Kurdish 
nationalism... was not a cause of [the Ottoman] 
Empire’s disintegration, but rather the result of 
it.”(29) 
M. Hakan Yavuz elaborates on the modern 
origins of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey when 
he declares: “The state’s [Turkey’s] policies 
are the determinant factors in the evolution and 
modulation of... Kurdish ethno-nationalism. 
The major reason for the politicization of 
Kurdish cultural identity is the shift from multi-
ethnic, multi-cultural 
realities of the Ottoman 
Empire to the nation-
state model.”(30) The 
Kemalist reforms, 
which aimed to create 
Kurdish nationalism . . . was not a 
cause of [the Ottoman] Empire’s 
disintegration, but rather the result 
of it
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a modern Turkish nation-state “resulted in the 
construction of Kurdish ethno-nationalism.”(31) 
Throughout his analysis, Yavuz emphasizes 
that “the major difference between Turkish 
and Kurdish nationalism is the presence 
of the state... Since Kurdish nationalism in 
Turkey, Iraq, and Iran evolved in response 
to modernizing nation-states, it constantly 
stresses its ethnic ‘difference,’ sometimes 
even evoking racism to historicize itself.”(32)
Hamit Bozarslan basically agrees with 
Yavuz’s analysis when he argues that 
two significant factors preventing Kurdish 
nationalism from exerting significant influence 
from 1919-1921 were “the ideal of Islamic 
fraternity, and the fear of the establishment 
of an Armenian state.”(33) However, “the 
proclamation of the Kemalist Republic in 1923 
meant the end of... the Ottoman tacit contract 
between centre and peripheries [and]... to a 
large extent explains the... traditional [Kurdish] 
dignitaries... participation in the subsequent 
revolts.”(34) 
Kurdish Nationalism in Iraq
Similarly in Iraq,(35) Kurdish nationalism 
only began to develop after World War I in 
response to the attempts to build a modern 
Arab state that would permit no more than a 
minimal amount of Kurdish autonomy.(36) Thus, 
the revolts of Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji in the 
1920s and Mulla Mustafa Barzani beginning 
in the 1930s were mainly tribal affairs at times 
opposed by more Kurdish josh (literally, little 
donkeys or Kurds who supported the Iraqi 
government in Baghdad) than supported. 
In discussing the revolts of Sheikh Mahmud 
Barzinji, for example, David McDowall argues 
that “he had little in common with today’s 
Kurdish leaders. Both the vocabulary and style 
are quite different. It is significant that Shaykh 
Mahmud did not waste his time appealing to 
nationalist sentiment. He was a sayyid [literally 
a reputed descendant of Muhammed], and the 
language his constituency understood was 
the language of Islam. In 1919 he appealed 
for a jihad, not a national liberation struggle. 
Furthermore, his style was to use kin and 
tribal allies and his aim was the establishment 
of a personal fiefdom.”(37) 
Barzani’s rise to prominence after his return 
to Iraq from exile in the Soviet Union in 1958 is 
not easy to fully explain unless one appreciates 
the contemporary roots of Kurdish nationalism 
in Iraq. As late as 1957, for example, no less an 
astute observer of affairs than C. J. Edmonds, 
who had been a British Political Officer in Iraq 
during the 1920s and also written a number of 
useful analyses of the Iraqi Kurds, mentioned 
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Barzani only in passing 
as a “fugitive rebel from 
Iraq,”(38) and concluded 
that “with every year that 
passes any concerted 
armed revolt becomes 
more improbable.” 
How wrong could 
anybody be? Two years later, although 
now realizing that “the event which perhaps 
more than any other has caught the popular 
imagination is the return of Mulla Mustafa,”(39) 
Edmonds could only argue that “it is difficult 
to explain this rapid build-up into a national 
all-Iraqi figure... otherwise than as the work 
of a well-organized chain of communist 
propagandists long established throughout 
Iraq.” Again how wrong could any analyst 
be? Given subsequent developments, 
Edmonds’s lack of foresight, stemmed from 
his understandable failure to predict the 
contemporary rise of Kurdish nationalism in 
Iraq as a reaction to the excesses of Iraqi Arab 
nationalism. 
Thus, only in the 1960s did the Kurdish 
movement in Iraq begin to take on the 
characteristics of a genuine nationalist 
movement. Following the destruction of the 
Mahabad Republic of Kurdistan in Iran in 1946, 
in which Barzani had been one of commanding 
generals, Barzani’s 
retreat to the Soviet 
Union subsequently 
became epic in the 
rise of modern Kurdish 
nationalism in Iraq: 
“We marched for fifty-
two days. In the high 
mountain passes the late spring snow was six 
to twelve feet deep. We fought nine encounters, 
lost four killed and had seven wounded.”(40) 
Even so, to his dying day, Barzani never fully 
exceeded the bounds of tribal chieftain. In 
part, this helps to explain his bitter disputes 
with Ibrahim Ahmad and Ahmad’s son-in-law, 
Jalal Talabani. 
In time, however, Saddam Hussein’s 
genocidal attempts to reduce the Kurds in 
the 1970s and 1980s,(41) had the opposite 
effect of fostering Kurdish nationalism in 
Iraq. Iraq’s defeat in the Gulf Wars of 1991 
and 2003 spawned the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG), a federal state in post-
Saddam-Hussein Iraq in which an increasingly 
strong sense of Iraqi Kurdish nationalism 
began to grow within what was largely a 
Kurdish-ruled state.(42) Social and economic 
factors also played important roles in the 
development of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq. 
The oil industry, construction of major dams, 
Kurdish nationalism only began 
to develop after World War I in 
response to the attempts to build a 
modern Arab state that would permit 
no more than a minimal amount of 
Kurdish autonomy
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cement and tobacco factories, and agricultural 
mechanization all created greater wealth 
and helped move people out of their smaller 
traditional valleys into the larger urban world. 
In the first decade of the 21st century, Iraqi 
Kurdish nationalism has become the most 
highly developed form of Kurdish nationalism 
among the entire 
Kurdish people, but 
clearly its origins are 
mainly contemporary, 
dating only to the events 
described briefly above.
The Bedir Khan 
brothers’ (Tureyya, 
Kamuran, and Celadet) attempt to develop or 
invent Kurdish nationalism in the 1920s and 
1930s also aptly illustrates its contemporary 
roots. The three brothers were grandsons of the 
famous Bedir Khan of Botan whose powerful 
emirate was only destroyed by the Ottomans in 
1847. The three brothers grappled with many 
problems, including the ambivalent nature of 
the Kurdish relationship with the Turks and 
the primitive state of affairs in Kurdistan. As 
Martin Strohmeier notes, “all Kurds were 
deeply if variously enmeshed in social, 
ideological, economic and personal relations 
with the Turks... These bonds hampered the 
development of a self-assertive, robust and 
distinct Kurdish identity.”(43) Although Bedir 
Khan’s writings were propagandistic and 
contained simplistic, misleading, and distorted 
analyses of Kurdish history, they still maintain 
an important influence on the subsequent 
development of Kurdish nationalism and its 
analysis. 
Celadet Bedir Khan 
was elected the first 
president of Khoybun, 
a transnational Kurdish 
party created in 1927 
by Kurdish intellectuals 
living in exile in Syria. 
The party sought to 
establish a strong Kurdish national liberation 
movement with a trained fighting force that 
would not depend on the traditional tribal 
leaders and helped instigate the unsuccessful 
Ararat uprising of the Kurds in 1927-1930. 
Subsequently, Celadet Bedir Khan devoted 
himself to literary work and helped to develop 
a Kurdish alphabet in Latin characters. During 
his final years in the 1960s, he served as a 
spokesman for Mulla Mustafa Barzani, the 
famous Iraqi Kurdish leader discussed above. 
In 1937, Kamuran Bedir Khan published 
Der Adler [Eagle] von Kurdistan, a formalistic 
and forgotten attempt to write an epic novel to 
promote the Kurdish cause on the magnitude 
only in the 1960s did the Kurdish 
movement in Iraq begin to take on 
the characteristics of a genuine 
nationalist movement
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of Franz Werfel’s classic, The Forty Days of 
Musa Dagh for the Armenians. Bedir Khan 
attempted to forge an imagined Kurdish 
nation that illustrated its heroism, patriotism, 
reverence for the land, identification with the 
mountains, pride in the language and heritage, 
beauty of the folk tales and songs, strong 
and patriotic women, and overall Kurdish 
solidarity. He even sought to assert that the 
Kurds’ true religion was Zoroastrianism and 
that the Biblical Garden of Eden had a Kurdish 
counterpart in the legend of the Thousand 
Lakes (Bingol). Proverbs such as “Lion, put 
your faith in your paws,” demonstrated how 
the Kurds relied on their own strength and did 
not merely await divine aid. Kamuran Bedir 
Khan’s effort to produce a Kurdish national 
epic, however, proved unsuccessful and failed 
to stir Kurdish nationalism. The large majority 
of the Kurds had not yet imbued enough 
sense of Kurdish nationalism to part with other 
Muslims.
The Current Situation in Iraq
At the present time the relationship between 
Baghdad and the KRG “is characterized by 
suspicion, animosity and brinkmanship”(44) that 
“threaten the stability of the [Iraqi] state at a 
far deeper political level.”(45) As the Baghdad 
government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki 
grew in strength and confidence, it naturally 
began to seek to reimpose its authority 
over the northern Kurdish part of the state. 
The 2005 constitution that guaranteed real 
federalism and thus semi-independence for 
the KRG was now challenged as having been 
imposed at a moment of weakness. Many (but 
not all(46)) Shiite and Sunni Arabs now seek to 
return to what they see as the rightful situation 
of a more centralized state. 
For the past several years, Massoud 
Barzani, the president of the KRG and al-
Maliki have been locked in a bitter verbal 
struggle over the situation. During a tense 
meeting in Baghdad in November 2008, for 
example, Barzani told al-Maliki “you smell like 
a dictator”(47) and also declared that the Iraqi 
prime minister was “playing with fire.”(48) In 
August 2008, these semantic fireworks nearly 
resulted in open hostilities over the disputed 
city of Khanaqin situated in Diyala province 
some 90 miles north of Baghdad on their de 
facto internal border often referred to as the 
“trigger line.” Here the Kurdish peshmerga 
Although Bedir Khan’s writings 
were propagandistic and contained 
simplistic, misleading, and distorted 
analyses of Kurdish history, they 
still maintain an important influence 
on the subsequent development of 
Kurdish nationalism and its analysis
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ignored an ultimatum by the Iraqi Security 
Forces (ISF) to withdraw within 24 hours. After 
some very tense brinkmanship, the two sides 
each withdrew some 15 miles north and south 
of the city leaving security within Khanaqin 
to be handled by the 
police. 
The two sides have 
come close to fighting 
on several subsequent 
occasions. Only the 
presence of U.S. 
troops stationed nearby seemed to prevent 
bloodshed.(49) Now that these troops are 
gone, the situation may become even more 
untenable. For example, in November 2012, 
tensions mounted over the formation of 
Baghdad’s Dijla Operations Command, a new 
military formation that was to operate in the 
area over which both Baghdad and the KRG 
claimed jurisdiction. Troops from the two sides 
faced off in what one report declared was 
“a crisis that... could erupt into a full-blown 
war,”(50) before tensions were defused.
Oil-rich and strategically located Kirkuk, 
of course, represents the center of these 
Baghdad-KRG tensions. It “is a classic divided 
city... over which people are prepared to fight 
and die... The numbers of actors involved, 
resource dimensions, and international 
involvement-add... layers of complexity that 
are matched by few other disputes over 
territorial ‘ownership.”(51) From a position of 
initial strength that appeared to be ready to 
hand Kirkuk to the KRG under the provisions 
of Article 140 of the 2005 Iraqi constitution, 
the contested city and 
province now seem 
the proverbial bridge 
too far for the Kurds 
to take. Kirkuk also 
represents the 
opposing constitutional 
positions with the Kurds maintaining that the 
Iraqi constitution (including Article 140) must 
be implemented, while Baghdad has become 
increasingly critical of the constitution in 
general and particularly Article 140 as being 
part of a constitution written for a now dated 
situation. 
Ironically, however, many Arabs fall back 
on the constitution by pointing to Article 142, 
which implements the promise to the Sunnis to 
review the document by allowing amendments 
agreed to by a parliamentary majority to be 
passed together as one bloc.(52) Indeed an Iraqi 
Constitutional Review Committee has been at 
work since the adoption of the constitution in 
2005. Maybe its most important work has been 
to try to define the constitutional definition of 
federalism as it would be implemented in a 
manner acceptable to all Iraqi parties.
During a tense meeting in Baghdad 
in November 2008, for example, 
Barzani told al-Maliki “you smell like 
a dictator”
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How then will ties between the KRG and 
Baghdad play out?(53) Clearly, their political 
future remains in doubt. Whether Iraq will 
remain truly federal as the KRG demands 
or federal in name only as the Arabs 
recentralize the state remains to be seen. 
However, KRG president Massoud Barzani 
has unequivocally warned: “We will not allow 
the Kurdish people’s achievements to be 
wrecked by the Iraqi parliament. Iraq will fall 
apart if the Iraqi constitution is violated.”(54) 
In addition, as Stansfield and Anderson 
concluded: “A government founded on Arab 
nationalism, devoid of Kurdish representation 
and dedicated to 
eliminating meaningful 
Kurdish autonomy in the 
north, would spell the 
beginning of the end for 
the territorial integrity of 
Iraq.”(55) Given its much 
greater resources, time 
seems to be on the side of Baghdad. Does this 
mean that the KRG might be tempted to strike 
before it is too late? So far, Baghdad and the 
KRG have shown a wisdom and maturity that 
argues against any such rash action. Violence 
and even civil war, if they come, are more 
likely to eventuate inadvertently. However, 
just how often can the two sides dodge the 
proverbial bullet? 
Conclusion
That the roots of Kurdish nationalism 
lie mainly (although not completely) in 
contemporary times in no way impugns either 
its current existence or legitimacy. Indeed 
its contemporary roots are not unique. Arab, 
Turkish, and Iranian nationalisms are only 
slightly older, while that of the European 
nations-where the concept of nationalism was 
born-are also relatively new. 
It is true, of course, that Kurdish nationalism-
compared to that of its immediate neighbors 
in Turkey, the Arab world, and Iran-has been 
stunted and divided. 
In addition, this article 
has shown that Kurdish 
nationalism largely 
developed in the 20th 
century as a stateless 
ethnic reaction against 
the repressive “official 
state nationalisms” 
of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Martin van 
Bruinessen has commented on how “the 
sort of ‘nation building’ policies that were so 
successfully implemented in the earlier period 
appear to have the reverse result in the present... 
Since the 1970s... repressive measures 
directed at the expression of Kurdish nationalist 
sentiment have had the effect of strengthening 
rather than eliminating it.”(56) Moreover, referring 
Given its much greater resources, 
time seems to be on the side of 
Baghdad. Does this mean that the 
KRG might be tempted to strike 
before it is too late? 
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specifically to the Kurds, Murat Somer recently 
noted how “people can have multiple and mixed 
conceptions of their identities, whereby ethnicity 
has to compete with other sources of belonging, 
such as national, supranational, and regional 
identities.”(57) These problems and differences 
in Kurdish nationalism, however, do not negate 
its existence, which continues to develop and 
mature. 
Recently, for example, the development 
of transnational space has led “to externally 
based opportunity structures such as diasporic 
networks, international nongovernmental 
organizations, host-country democratic 
systems, and advanced telecommunication 
systems that provide new forms of support or 
constraint to Kurdish nationalist projects.”(58) In 
Iraq, “the creation of a protected, autonomous 
region encouraged the transfer of people, 
ideas, and resources to Iraqi Kurdistan, 
all of which helped advance the notion of 
Kurdish self-rule.”(59) In Turkey, “access to 
European Union institutions has reinforced 
ties to the international 
network of human-
rights organizations 
and created a new 
legal political arena 
for Kurdish nationalist 
claims... a ‘juridicization’ 
of Kurdayeti at the 
international level”(60) 
not present even in Iraq. 
Indeed, early in the 21st century, Kurdish 
nationalism bids fair to challenge the future of 
such states as Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria. In 
northern Iraq particularly, Kurdish nationalism 
has flourished since the creation of the KRG, 
a de facto Kurdish state created following 
the defeat of Iraq in the 1991 and 2003 Gulf 
Wars. Under the protection of a no-fly zone 
enforced against the government of Saddam 
Hussein until his fall in 2003, an entire Kurdish 
generation was raised under a Kurdish-run 
administration and learned to speak only 
Kurdish, not Arabic. In addition, a Kurdish 
civil society began to emerge with dozens of 
newspapers, magazines, and television and 
radio stations using the Kurdish language and 
representing a broad spectrum of opinion. 
The Kurds enjoyed freedoms impossible to 
imagine in the rest of Iraq. Furthermore, an 
increasingly influential and, in part, highly 
educated diaspora of more then 500,000 
Kurds in the West(61) has provided a reservoir of 
support for the Kurdish 
nationalism developing 
in this de facto state. 
The U.S. war that 
removed Saddam 
Hussein from power in 
2003 has furthered the 
development of Kurdish 
Under the protection of a no-
fly zone enforced against the 
government of Saddam Hussein until 
his fall in 2003, an entire Kurdish 
generation was raised under a 
Kurdish-run administration and 
learned to speak only Kurdish, not 
Arabic
Michael M. Gunter: The Contemporary Roots Of Kurdish Nationalism In Iraq
43KUFA REVIEW: No.2 - Issue 1 - Winter 2013
nationalism in Iraq.(62) At the expense of its 
inveterate opponent Turkey, Iraqi Kurdish 
nationalism became an even closer U.S. ally 
than anyone could have possibly expected. 
This ironic situation was 
brought about by Turkey 
refusing to allow the 
United States to use its 
territory as a base for a 
northern front to attack 
Iraq in March 2003. 
The Iraqi Kurds were 
suddenly thrust into the 
role of U.S. ally, a novel position they eagerly 
and successfully assumed. During the post-
war insurgency that turned many sections of 
Arab Iraq into a very dangerous place, the 
Kurdish area of Iraq served as a relatively 
peaceful haven and Kurdish nationalism as 
the staunchest supporter of the United States. 
In return, the U.S.- supported new constitution 
for Iraq has given the Kurds an enormous 
power over their future in Iraq.
As of the beginning of 2013, Iraqi Kurdish 
nationalism is in a uniquely powerful position 
given its virtual veto power over future 
developments in Iraq. If the Arabs will not 
agree to a democratic federal Iraq that 
satisfies the goals of Kurdish nationalism, 
the Kurds will simply continue administering 
themselves as they have since 1991. Indeed, 
two unofficial referenda held in 2004 and 
2005 almost unanimously opted for Kurdish 
independence. Geopolitical realities, of course, 
currently prohibit independence, but who can 
accurately predict what the future will bring if 
a democratic federal 
Iraq proves impossible 
to create? Kurdish 
nationalism in Iraq may 
come to be seen as 
having the right-in the 
name of stability that 
also would benefit the 
United States, Turkey, 
and other neighboring states-to move towards 
independence. 
What is more, given the fact that greater 
Kurdistan contains a sizeable amount of the 
oil in the Middle East as well as the water, 
Kurdish nationalism clearly will impact 
the region’s and, therefore, the world’s 
future. To begin to come to grips with these 
consequences, therefore, other states and 
nations must grant the legitimacy of Kurdish 
nationalism. Once this legitimacy is admitted, 
then stable and just solutions to the problems 
it entails may be found. Kurdish national self-
determination need not necessarily destroy 
the territorial integrity of the states the Kurds 
now inhabit. Various forms of autonomy, 
federalism, and even simple but genuine 
democracy may satisfy the just demands of 
Kurdish nationalism.(63)
Geopolitical realities, of course, 
currently prohibit independence, 
but who can accurately predict what 
the future will bring if a democratic 
federal Iraq proves impossible to 
create? 
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